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1. SUMMARY: Four District Courts -- three 3-Judge 
Courts and one 1-Judge Court -- have declared unconstitu-
tional those parts of the Social Security Act which condition 
II 1'\ 
husband and widower's benefits on a showing of dependency, 
in light of the fact that no such showing is required for 
wives and widows. The SG has filed four appeals under 
28 U.S.C. § 1252 -- from these decisions seeking to reverse 
them on the merits. He concedes that in all but one of the 
cases the appellee had achieved a sufficiently final rejection 
of his claim from the Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare 
that the District Courts properly had jurisdiction over the 
cases. The husband and widower in two of the cases has filed 
a cross-appeal attacking the refusal of the court below to 
issue what they refer to as an "injunction." 
2. FACTS: Payment of social security benefits to a 
husband, on account of the wages earned by his retired wife, 
is conditioned, inter alia, on a demonstration that the husband 
was receiving at least one-half of his support from his wife at 
the time of retiremento 42 U.S.Co § 402(c). Payment of socia~ 
security benefit~ to a widower, on account of the wages earned 
.by his wife, is conditioned, inter alia, on a demonstration that 
the widower was receiving at least one-half of his support from 
his wife at the time of her death. Payment of such benefits to 
wives of retired husbands and to widows is not so conditioned. 
Dependency is conclusively presumed. 
• 
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Appellees Goldfarb and Coffin were denied widower's 
benefits under the dependency requirement; and appellees 
Silbowitz, Jablon and Coffin were denied husband's benefits 
under the same requirement. All but Coffin concededly had 
their claims for benefits finally denied by the Secretary of 
HEW. The SG claims Coffin did not. However, the SG does not 
wish the issue to be decided. If one of the other cases is 
vers 
reversed, the SG says the Coffin case can be reill!l·ed without 
reaching the jurisdictional issue. If the other appeals are 
af~irm~d, the SG will withdraw the . appeal in Coffin . 
. " ' . 
The courts below all declared 42 U.S.C. § 402(c) and 
(f) unconstitutional on the authority of Fronterio v. Richardson , 
411 U.S. 677, and Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, re-
versing the Secretary's refusal to pay benefits to the appellees. 
The courts in Coffin and Jablon refused to grant '
1
injunctions'' 
a~ainst the Secretary's application of the statute . 
3. CONTENTIONS: The SG says that the decisions below 
will cost the Social Security trust fund $400 million a year in 
benefits which Congress never intended to pay. Dependency is 
the principle upon which widows, widowers, husbands and wives' 
benefits are to be paid under the Act. Seven out of eight wives 
are dependent on their husbands within the Act's definition of 
dependency, and only one out of eight husbands is dependent on 
his wife. It is thus reasonable for the Congress to conclude 
that it is cheaper to pay all wives than to go through the ad-
~~ 
ministrative expense of separatin~ · the one out of eight which 
;\ 




This conclusion is powerfully fortified by the 
fact that another condition of receipt of widows or wives' 
benefits is that the widow or wife must not be receiving 
social security benefits of her own in an amount larger than 
Oll._Ci l-' 0 u. • .-1 D:; h; S ~ IA.H ·) W ,;, ~~! ) ~ 
those received by her husb-an~(: In almost every <!ase of a non-
dependent wife or widow, she will be unable to meet this other 
criterion. The SG acknowledges, of course, that the same 
principle weeds out most non-dependent husbands and widowers. 
~~;II 
However, there isA~considerable number of men who earn more 
than their wives, but who do so in jobs which do not contribute 
to social security and who therefore do not receive larger 
social security payments than their wives. It is this class of 
people who will receive the $400 million of which the SG com-
plains o 
The SG seems to recognize that this case is at first 
blush squarely governed by Fronterio v. Richardson, supra. He 
argues, however, that the determinative factor in Fronterio \va s 
that the dependency presumption there had the effect of giving 
men greater compensation for equal work. Here compensation is 
not the purpose of the payments. Insurance for dependent per-
sons whose provider has ceased to provide is. The SG points t o 
no language in Fronterio which supports his interpretation of 
it and I have found none. The SG's argument really seems to be 
that after Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, in which this 
Court applied a rational basis test to a social security act 
classification, Fronterio is to be limited to its facts. 
- 5 -
Appellees disagree. 
In their cross-appeal, the husbands -- or more 
accurately their lawyers who are the same in each case 
complain that no "injunction" was issued. That is not, 
however, what they really mean. They are aware that the orders 
below require the Secretary to pay money to their clients and 
that he will do so even if not subject to contempt for failure 
to do so. What they want is an injunction ordering the I 
Secretary to pay people other than their clients but who are 
similarly situated. ertified.) 
4. DISCUSSION: I thought that the reason for the 
Fronterio decision was that the classification was on the basis 
of sex. However, this is the express reasoning of only four 
members of the Court. The brief remarks of a fifth member of 
the Court make it difficult to determine whether the fact that 
the classification was sex-based entered into his decision. If 
the fact that the classification in Fronterio was gender-based 
was important to the decision, Salfi would not be particularly 
relevant. Otherwise, it might be. Perhaps then one of the 
I I 
appeals should be noted to resolve the uncertainty. 
order 
The cross-appeals seem frivolous to me. Courts do not 
----- ·1;, defendants to pay money~or fashion other relief running~ 
1\ 
to people who are not parties to a law suit. The class action 
) 
device was invented to avoid the multiplicity of suits which 
might result from this proposition. No classes were certified 
bel~~yway, the Secretary will be morally bound by any ~ 
( 
- 6 -
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No. 75-699, Mathews v. Goldfarb 
This memorandum, dictated after a preliminary look 
at the briefs, is intended only as an "aid to memory" that will 
refresh my recollection when I return to a more careful study 
of the case prior to argument and decision. When an opinion is 
expressed or intimated, it is wholly tentative. 
* * * * 
This is one of several appeals from decisions invalidating 
the provisions of Section 402 of the Social Security Act that im-
pose a condition that a widower is entitled to benefits from his 
deceased wife's Social Security only if he ~hows that he was 
receiving at least one half of his support from the wife when she 
died. No such showing is required by a widow. 
Appellee's brief states, correctly I believe, that five 
appeals by the Solicitor General challenge this holding. (For a 
list of the cases, see appellee's brief, p. 3.) This case, Goldfarb, 
No. 75-699 2. 
was the first case docketed. It is here from a three-judge court 
in New York, where in a conclusory and brief per curiam opinion, 
the court said: 
It is conceded that had the gender of these 
spouses been reversed, the plaintiff would 
have been granted Social Security benefits. 
A female need not show "at least one-half 
support from" the deceased spouse. • • • 
Thus, the statute and its application to 
[Goldfarb], "deprive women of protection 
for their families that men receive as a 
result of their employment." 
The three-judge court stated that the "case is controlled by 
Wiesenfeld." 
Circuit Judge Moore , concurred because he considered 
Frontiero (411 u.s. 677) and Wiesenfeld (420 U.S. 636) to be 
controlling. Judge Moore indicated his disagreement with these 
decisions: 
The Congress presumably, after giving the 
problem due consideration and weighing the 
pertinent facts, enacted the legislation 
in question. If there are to be presumptions 
it would be but fair to the legislative branch 
to presume that their enactments were designed 
to be rationally related to the goal which 
they desired to achieve. By this decision it 
seems to me that the court is creating a new 
class of beneficiaries which Congress did 
not create. 
The SG! s Position 
Congress first enacted a program of survivors' benefits 
in 1939, including only aged widows. Not until 1950 did it bring 
No. 75-699 3. 
aged widowers under the Act. Different standards of eligibility 
were prescribed for the two classes of beneficiaries. The SG 
argues that: 
Those differences arose from the fact that 
a very substantial proportion of aged widows 
found themselves in dire need upon the death 
of their spouse, while aged widowers were 
better situated because they had generally 
been self-supporting over most of their working 
lives. It was therefore rational for Congress 
in 1939 to provide aged widows with benefits 
without their having to prove that their hus-
bands had supported them. Such a requirement 
would have been an unnecessary burden on the 
vast majority of such widows, who would qualify 
in any event; and it would have gratuitously 
increased the administrative complexity of 
the widows' benefit program. 
In contrast, since the vast majority of 
widowers were not dependent on their spouses, 
it was rational for Congress to conclude in 
1950 that the probable needs of this class 
warranted extension of survivors' benefits to 
widowers only when they had been dependent on 
their wives for a substantial part of their 
support. 
The SG's brief is replete with statistics said to support 
the rationality of classifying widowers differently from widows. 
See SG's brief, pp. 26, 27, 34. 
As would be expected, the SG relies primarily on cases 
in which the Court has repeatedly applied the rational basis test 
(some would say the minimum rational basis test) to economic and 
social legislation. These cases include the familiar ones of 
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 u.s. 78, 81; Dandridge v. Williams, 
No. 75-699 4. 
397 u.s. at 487i and Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495. In 
response to appellee's position that this gender-based classifi-
cation is invalid under Frontiero and Wiesenfeld, the SG relies 
on Kuhn v. Shevin, 416 u.s. 351, and Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 
u.s. 498. 
Position of Appellee 
In an elaborate and spphisticated brief for appellee 
(Ginsberg, Wolff and Peratis for the ACLU), the emphasis --as 
expected -- is on the alleged sex discrimination. Female wage-
earners are denied Social Security benefits (for their spouse) 
accorded the spouse of male wage-earners. Viewed in this light, 
Wiesenfeld does seem to be controlling. 
Comments 
As is evident, I am undertaking only the briefest 
identification of the issue and positions of the parties. Nor 
am I undertaking at this time any analysis of the competing 
authorities. I have the issue well in mind, and think it must be 
resolved by a careful application of the cases mentioned above. 
At the time we noted this case, I thought it rather clear 
that this gender-based classification was invalid under Wiesenfeld 
and Frontiero. Having now scanned the briefs, and reflected further 
on the issue, I am no longer confident that my initial view is correct. 
No. 75-699 5. 
There is a good deal to Judge Moore's view. Neither party relies 
specifically on any designated portion of the legislative history, 
and yet is clear that Congress deliberately classified widowers 
differently from widows. It is also clear, as indicated by the 
statistics in the SG's brief, that this difference in classification 
was not a frivolous one. Whatever may be the situation in the 
future, in 1950 -- and even now the economic facts support 
the Congressional judgment that the need of widows is of a dif-
ferent character and magnitude from the need of widowers. Thus, 
if the classification is viewed in terms of the purpose of the 
Social Security Act (to provide for the needy aged), the classi-
fication is rational. If, however, it is viewed from that of a 
working wife who pays the same Social Security taxes as the husband, 
the classification is certainly gender-based, and -- under our 
~
cases -- has a degree of "suspectness" not present in other equal 
protection analysis. 
I would like for my clerk to present both sides of this 
issue as strongly as possible in light of our prior decisions. 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Justice Powell DATE: August 12, 1976 
FROM: Tyler Baker 
No. 75-699 Matthews v. Goldfarb 
1 
This case arose from the denial by the Social Security 
Administration of appellee's application for monthly social 
security survivors' benefits (widower's insurance) on the 
earnings record of his deceased wife, Hannah Goldfarb. Mrs. 
Goldfarb had contributed to social security pursuant to the 
Federal Insurance Contributions Act for a period of 25 years 
and was a fully insured person under the system. The Social 
Security Administration denied appellee's application for the 
following reason: 
You do not qualify for a widower's benefit because 
you do not meet one of the [statutory] requirements 
for such entitlement. This requirement is that you 
must have been receiving at least one half support 
from your wife when she died. 
The dependency requirement relied on by the Social Security 
Administration is mandated by 42 U.S.C. § 402(f )(l)(D). There 
is no such dependency requirement for the payment of the 
survivor's benefits (widow's insurance) to the spouse of a 
·~ -----------
male insured individual. 42 U.S.C. § 402(e). 
Had appellee not been required to show dependency, as 
defined above, he would have been entitled to benefits. There 
are several other requirements, including age and absence 
of remarriage. One of these additional requirements needs to 
be emphasized for purposes of the discussion that follows. 
The appellee was required to show that he was not personally 
entitled to old-age insurance benefits equal to or in excess 
2 
of his deceased wife's primary insurance amount. 42 U.S.C. 
2. 
402(f)(l)(E). This requirement must also be met by widows l 
applying for benefits under their deceased husbands' account. 
Appellee was able to meet this requirement, not because he was 
entitled to lower primary benefits than his wife, but rather 
because he was entitled to no benefits at all. Appellee had 
been employed as a federal employee and, therefore, had not been ~ 
underl:h: :::~a:h:::u::::i::~t::ea:h:::~judge DC held that the 
~unconstitutionality of the challenged statute was established 
by this Court's decision in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 
636 (1975). The DC noted that Mrs. Goldfarb had paid taxes 
at the same rate as men and that "there is not the slightest 
scintilla of support for the propos i tion that working women 
are less concerned about their spouses' welfare in old age than 
are men." J.S. at 3a. Working from those propositions, the 
DC found the following language from Wiesenfeld to be conclusive: 
[S]he not only failed to receive for her family 
the same protection which a similarly situated 
male worker would have received, but she also 
was deprived of a portion of her own earnings 
in order to contribute to the fund out of which 
benefits would be paid to others. Since the 
Constitution forbids the gender-based differentia-
tion premised upon ~ssum~tiogs as to dependency 
made in the statutes before us in Frontiero, 
the Constitution also forbids the gender-based 
differentiation that results in the efforts of 
women workers required to pay social security 
taxes producing less protection for their families 
than is produced by the efforts of men. 420 U.S., 
at 645. 
It is impossible to determine from the DC's opinion whether 
3. 
the Government made any attempt to introduce any empirical 
evidence in support of the statutory differentiation. Certainly, 
there are no findings of fact of the type made in Craig v. Boren. 
explanation may be that the DC assumed that no such 
empirical demonstration would affect the legal conclusion. 
Th ,, . 1 '\d . . b d . h . ere are two p~vota ec~s~ons to e rna e ~n t e ~nstant 
case. Tht!?irst is the determination of the Congressional 
purpose in enacting the challenged statute. The analysis here 
............. ~ 
could provide an opportunity to give Prof. Gunther's intermediate 
equal protection theory a mild boost. Assuming that my view 
of the congressional purpose is correct, th~estion then 
becomes whether administrative convenience and savings can 
ever be a sufficient ground for a gender-based discrimination, 
for that is the only justification for the differentiation here. 
I certainly would not want to make administrative convenience 
an automatic justification in these cases, but I do think that 
th~term mal s omej tim;: mask a much harder problem: giving up -a good program, or extending it to areas where there is not 
a perceived need, or wasting large amounts of scarce resources 
in inefficient paper shuffling. Both of the above questions 
are posed in an interesting context. If my reading of 
congressional purpose is correct, the claim for equal treatment 
I 
here is for treatment that is fundamentally inconsistent with 
the underlying theory of the statute. ----- --
4. 
Congressional Purpose: 
An interesting shift in argument occurs between the SG's 
Jurisdictional Statement and his Brief. Of the two, the 
r 
following argument from the Jurisdictional Statement is by far 
~ 
the more straightforward and, in my view, candid. The argument 
benefits, as with 
'
Y/!:i vi~ .. ~fohrmererslyocial security provisions, is to replace the support 
VV ~o provided by the insured person and lost as a result 
of his/her death. The proof of that support is dependency as 
~~ defined by the statute. In the Jurisdictional Statement, the 
SG argues simply that, "This legislative classification 
reasonably implements t 9q object~e of Congress to confer 
Social Security benefits upon spouses who were dependent upon 
the primary wage earner." JS at 7. The argument continues 
that it is a demonstrable fact that many more women are dependent 
on men than vice versa. The SG then cites Salfi as support for 
the proposition that administrative convenience justifies using 
a presumption of dependency for widows but not for widowers. 
The SG recognized that the challenged statute "may result in 
the payment of benefits to some women whose earnings were not 
covered by the Social Security Act and who were in fact self-
~ ~~ supporting." J.S. at 11 n. 10. Despite that acknowledgment, 
" ~4J~ the SG argues that when tested by the standards established 
'~ in Salfi, the statute is constitutional. 
the SG seems to have lost his nerve; he 
The argument sketched above is 
/ 
5. 
not entirely abandoned, but it is now embellished with another, 
quite different argument. Unfortunately, the strands of the 
arguments become tangled. The new argument is an attempt to 
justify the statute under the Court's existing sex discrimina-
tion doctrine, with primary reliance being placed on the Court's 
decision in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). Rather than 
N 
relying on labor statistics to support the presumption of 
---------:-,,--
dependency, as in the Jurisdictional Statement, the SG now relies ---~------------------------------------
1 
on those statistics to emphasize the desperate economic plight 
--~
of widows. Because of the need of widows as a group, the SG --now argues that Congress intended to give them benefits under 
this statute even when they would not otherwise qualify under 
the standards applied to widowers. Under this theory, the 
payment to widows who would not have been eligible had they 
been men is not regretted over-inclusiveness resulting from 
administrative necessity, but the intentional act of a Congress 
recognizing the problems of widows as a class. If the SG's 
analysis were accepted, the case would be similar to Kahn in 
Court upheld a state law giving a property tax 
exemption to all widows regardless of need. The instant case 
is, however, distinguish~le because of the asserted discrimina-., -
tion against women workers who have paid social security 
contributions. Kahn did not involve this problem of equal 
payments, but unequal benefits, because the property tax break 
was financed, in effect, by all property taxpayers. Also Kahn 
involved the area of state taxation, an area in which the Court 
has consistently given the states wide berth. 
6. 
Apart from the fact that the SG discovered the congres-
sional purpose to help widows after submitting his Jurisdictional 
Statement, I don't find it very convincing. The decision to 
include a group such as widows or children of insured workers 
was undoubtedly made on the basis of the perceived need of the 
group. Perceived need was certainly one of the motivating 
factors leading to the adoption of the social security system. 
I The question remains, however, why Congress did not include a dependency showing for widows as well as widowers. The fact 
that the group of widows was included does not necessarily 
indicate a congressional intent that every member of the group 
recover benefits. Indeed, the requirement applicable to both 
widows and widowers, that the claimant have primary benefits 
of their own less than those of the other person belies any 
congressional intention to benefit all widows in a way 
comparable to the property tax exemption in Kahn. Since that 
requirement was imposed on widows, the SG must argue that 
Congress concluded that the impoverished state of widows 
justified exemption from one requirement - dependency - but 
not exemption from another - level of primary benefits. In 
fact, as appellee's case indicates, it seems more likely that 
the two requirements were really paired s o that one require-
ment would catch anyone who for some reason slipped by the 
other. Although the dependency requirement is omitted for 
widows, I think that it is most likely that Congress simply 
assumed that the vast majority of widows were dependent on 
7. 
their deceased husbands and decided to omit the re~irement 
of an individualized showing. In Wiesenfeld, the Court speaking 
of the 1939 Act generally, concluded that its framers "legislated 
on the'then generally accepted presumption that a man is 
responsible for the support of his wife and children.'" 420 
U.S. at 644 (citation omitted). The following statement from 
the SG's Jurisdictional Statement rings true to me: 
Actual or presumed dependency is a central 
feature of all dependents' benefits under the 
Act where the purpose is to compensate for the loss 
of the wage-earner's support. Thus, in addition 
to the benefits afforded husbands, wives, widows, 
and widowers of retirement age, dependency is also 
an underlying requirement for parents' benefits 
(42 U.S.C. 402(h), children's benefits (42 U.S.C. 
402(d), and divorced wife's benefits (42 U.S.C. 402(b)). 
J.S. at 9 n. 8. 
Further evidence for this position can be derived from the 
structure of the 1939 Act which extended secondary benefits 
to widows for the first time. Under the Act, the group ·entitled 
to benefits without a showing of dependency was defined to 
include all widows living in the same household as their 
husband. Widows who had been living apart from their husbands -
to whom the presumption of dependency is obviously weakened -
could recover, but only by showing that the deceased husband 
had contributed to their support. SG Brief at 21. The require-
ment that a separated wife make such a showing was eliminated 
in 1957. Although the SG draws a different conclusion from 
the elimination, it seems consistent to me with a congressional 
determination that it was not worth the trouble and the expense. 
Finally, the SG's analysis would require the conclusion that 
Congress had converted the social security system into a 
partial general welfare system. 
Administrative Convenience/Expense 
8. 
It may be too late in the day to uphold a gender-based 
discrimination on the basis of administrative convenience/expense. 
In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), one of the articulated 
objectives of the rule pr eferring male administrators was the 
elimination of an additional contested hearing. The Court 
recognized the legitimacy of that objective, but found that it 
was not sufficient to justify the unequal treatment. Similarly, 
in Frontiero, the only justification advanced by the government 
was administrative convenience. The plurality noted that the 
government had not demonstrated that it was cost efficient to 
presume dependency of wives of male officers, but went on to 
say that administrative convenience is simply not sufficient to 
justify a suspect classification. The concurrence written by 
you was based on Reed, but without elaboration. It would be 
reasonable for a reader to conclude that administrative 
convenience was also rejected as a justification in Frontiero. 
Wiesenfeld is a case with two rationales. The first 
rationale extends the decision in Frontiero from the context 
of a contract of employment to the context of social security 
payments. Finding that the gender-based differentiation at 
issue there amounted to "the denigration of the efforts of 
women who do work and whose earnings contribute significantly 
9. 
to their families support, the Court held that Wiesenfeld was 
controlled by Frontiero, 420 U.S. at 645. The Court also 
considered the government's argument that the differentiation 
was intended to benefit women because of the difficulties that 
they face in the labor market. The Court found that the 
asserted purpose was not the purpose at all. This finding 
led to what is, in fact, a second rationale: 
Given the purpose of enabling the surviving parent 
to remain at ho~ to care for a child, the gender-
based distinction of § 402(g) is entirely irrational. 
420 U.S., at 651. 
I 
The second rationale was the sole ground of decision relied 
upon by Justice Rehnquist. 
You based your concurrence on an analysis quite similar 
to the Court's first rationale: 
A surviving father may have the same need for 
benefits as a surviving mother. The statutory 
scheme therefore impermissibly discriminates 
against a female wage earner because it provides 
her family less protection than it provides that 
of a male wage earner, even though the family needs 
may be identical. I find no legitimate govern-
mental interest that supports this gender 
classification. 420 U.S., at 654-655. 
The first rationale in Wiesenfeld, ~ce, does ) 
appear to govern the instant case. Distinctions can, ~er, / 
be made. Administrative convenience cannot be asserted as 
-----~---------------that case as here because of the absolute nature of 
statute. Benefits were given to all widows with children 
with children. Indeed, the Court stated 
that the situation in Wiesenfeld was, if anything, more 
pernicious than in Frontiero because the male did not even 
tfi.. C"'-"' ~~ .t 1... c:t.A ~· ~ .q_ ;~ 
~~~~ ,f,...,.M 
have a chance to provl his dependency, as he did in Frontiero, 
and as he does here. ~ ~ w~·~~ (._z;;t.tt<• ~ 
I think that a more fundamental distinction based on the ~··~ 
apparent Congressional purpose in providing the survivorship 
benefits can be drawn. As stated above, I think that payments 
to nondependent widows are tolerated, rather than intended, on 
the theory that enough widows are in fact dependent that 
separating out those who are not is not worth the expense. 
Although the equal benefits for equal contributions argument can 
be made here, it does not really make any sense. The payment to 
nondepende~t widows is not made because of perceived need, but 
because it~ more efficient to do that than to separate them 
by an individualized test. The e~nale does not 
apply for widowers because of the relatively small incidence 
of dependency in that group. 
The claim for equality here is a claim for equality in 
c.A..... 
the distribution of benefits that ~ inconsistent with the 
underlying theory of the system. The payments being sought here 
are secondary payments sought by one person on the basis of 
another person's social security account. The purpose of the 
payments is to relieve the hardship of the loss of the support 
~-~ o~ the person who has died. If the claimant was not dependent 
~.~ upon insured person for one half of his support, Congress has 
~~~- ~e a decision that the hardship is not sufficient to justify 
~~ payment. There is an additional obstacle to one seeking payment. 
'~he claimant must not have a social security account in his or 




the person under whose account he 1\ claimS. If the account of 
the claimant is as large, Congress has made a decision that 
the claimant can simply rely on his primary benefits. Payment 
to a person who did not satisfy either of the above need-related 
conditions would be inconsistent with congressional purpose. 
Assuming that the dependency requirement were stricken, 
two groups of males would benefit. They would benefit in exactly 
the same way as similarly situated females, but the point is that 
to allow payments to either males ot females in those groups is 
inconsistent with congressional purpose. For persons covered 
by social security in their own employment, elimination of the 
dependency requirement would allow them to recover if they make 
more than 25% of the family income and less than 50%. Beyond 
/)./ 
50%, the claimant would fall Afoul of the requirement that the 
primary account not be equal to or more than the primary account 
of the person upon whose account the claim is made. If the 
claimant does not work in a job covered by social security, as 
is the case with appellee, the perversion of the congressional 
purpose is complete, because not even the 50% of family income 
would be a bar, because such persons do not have a primary 
account with social security of any amount. 
I do not think that the decided cases require this result. 
In Frontiero the stated purpose of the benefit program was to 
enhance the recruitment effort of the Air Force in enticing 
people away from private industry. The purpose of those benefits 
was not to satisfy any perceived need on the part of the 
12. 
beneficiaries. Congress chose, as it was certainly freeto do, 
to condition the extra benefits on dependency, rather than the 
mere fact of marriage. It does seem apparent that there was no 
necessary link between the showing of dependency and the achieve-
ment of the purpose - enhanced recruitment. Extending the 
benefits to Lt. Frontiero's spouse without a showing of 
dependency was not inconsistent with the congressional purpose. 
In Wiesenfeld there were, I think, two purposes. One found 
by the Court was to allow a parent to stay home with a child. 
{D ~~~~neutral. Extending the benefits to widowers 
with children actually advanced the purpose, and certainly 
was not inconsistent with it.~he second purpose was more 
generally to provide support for the parent left with the 
responsibility of supporting a child alone. Although there 
may have been a presumption of dependency underlying the 
statutory gender differentiation, there was no specific showing 
of dependency required. Furthermore, to the extent that there 
was a presumption of additional need on the part of women, the 
statute had an "equalizing" element. If the surviving spouse 
elected to work (in which case males might have an advantage), 
benefits were reduced by $ 1 for each $ 2 earned. Therefore, 
there was no real possibility for a male to make any use of his 
provision 
labor market advantage. This Atended to eliminate payments 
beyond the level of perceived need. 
,~ 
In the instant case, there is a Jdirect link between 
1- ~ 
the requirement that dependency be shown (or presumed) ~ 
.------
the reason for the program. As stated earlier, the underlying 
-----
13. 
basis of the social security system is ultimately need. It 
---------- ----- -- --seems that there was a decision that dependency is a fairly 
close predictor of need. To the extent that dependency is 
eliminated the system is cast free from its moorings. 
Stereotyping 
Appellee's arguments are littered with references to 
stereotyping, self-fulfilling prophecies, denigrating the 
contributions of women and the like. I do think that some 
kinds of streotyping in legislation are matters of genuine 
concern. I discussed the loose kinds of distinctions that I 
would draw in Craig v. Boren and will not repeat them here. 
I really do not feel that whatever stereotyping there might be 
This law simply does not 
J 
here is of the objectionable variety. 
"denigrate" the contributions of working women. I do not see 
that the statute, as I have interpreted its purpose, puts any 
different value on the work of men or women. It would be hard 
to argue that the effect of this differentiation is going to 
force or preclude any particular type of life-style. Stanton 
v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), is distinguishable on this ground. 
To the extent that a woman takes the differentiation, as I have 
interpreted it, as a comment on the value of her contribution 
to her family by her work, she simply misunderstands. If 
a showing of significant administrative savings can be made, 
the Coures upholding the statute would indicate no more than 
that so many fewer women have dependent spouses that there 
is a significant savings of scarce resources by using the 
assumption of dependency for widows. 
Conclusion 
I think that this case presents a real quandry. I am 
14. 
very reluctant to order a massive additional payment of benefits 
that are inconsistent with the statutory purpose. On the other 
hand, there seems to be nothing more here than an assertion of 
5 
administrative convenience and expense. Reed and Fronterio 
would preclude upholding a law on this basis alone, and I think 
that sex discrimination is different enough that a more 
convincing showing must be made. Unless the savings were quite 
significant (a matter of degree and judgment), I would not allow 
an administrative savings justification. From the statistics 
presented here, it is impossible to guess as to whether such a 
showing could be made. The median contribution to family income 
by wives who work is 27%, so a large numer of widows would not 
be able to meet the tests applied to widowers. There is nothing 
\ 
in the papers concerning the expense of conducting the 
individualized showing. 
On this point appellee and the ACLU are rather inconsistent. 
They argue that there is no proof that presuming widows to be 
dependent saves money, pointing out that millions of women earn 
enough money to cover at least one half of their own living 
expenses, and thus to fall foul of the dependency requirements. 
When addressing the question of the proper remedy in the event 
15. 
the Court accepts their argument, they argue against the 
extension of the dependency test, urging instead that these 
benefits be extended to all. The reason given is that extension 
of the dependency requirements would impose administrative burden 
of "potentially monstrous proportion." They argue that social 
security is an earned benefit and not a need-related welfare, -
ignoring the explicit requirements that Congress set up to try 
to keep some degree of need-relation present. 
If the Court were disposed to hold that demonstrated 
savings of significant amounts can be enough of a justification 
in a case of this type, it might consider remanding to the DC 
for findings on this question. If large scale savings cannot 
be shown, I would, if possible, leave it to the Social Security 
~~~..-!./' 
AdministrationAto chodSe whether to extend benefits to all 
without a showing of dependency or to require individualized 





1. This is one of five appeals docketed by appellant, 
Secretary of HEW, involving substantially the same question: 
whether the stringent support test restricting old-age survivors' 
benefits to a spouse on a female insured individual's earnings 
record, when no support test conditions benefits to a spous e on 
a male insured individual's earnings record, discriminates 
invidiously on the basis of gender in violation of the fifth 
amendment to the Constitution. The instant appeal was the first 
docketed. The remaining appeals, in order of docketing are: 
Mathews v. Silbowitz, No. 75-712, opinion below, 397 F. Supp. 
862 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Mathews v. Jablon, No. 75-739, opinion 
below, 399 F. Supp. 118 (D. Md. 1975); Mathews v. Coffin, No. 
75-791, opinion below, 400 F. Supp. 953 (D.D.C. 1975); Mathews 
v. Abbott, No. 75-1643, opinion below, ____ F. Supp. ____ . (N.D. 
Ohio, February 12, 1976). Each of the five district courts 
held the gender-explicit support test unconstitutional. Old-
age (husband's insurance) benefits are at issue in Silbowitz, 
Jablon and Abbott; survivors' (widower's insurance) benefits 
are at issue in the instant case; both old-age and survivors' 
(husband's and widower's insurance) benefits are at issue in 
Coffin. The Secretary has indicated that if this Court affirms 
the decision below, he may withdraw the remaining appeals. 
2. "Primary insurance amount" is the maximum monthly 
benefit payable to a retired worker covered by social security 
on the basis of his or her own earnings record. Beneficiaries 
other than the wage earner receive "secondary" or "derivative" 
benefits. 
N-2 
3. In Salfi this Court upheld a nine-month presumption 
of ulterior motive as a method of screening out persons who, 
in contemplation of death, marry in the hope of receiving or 
bestowing social security benefits. The admitted over-and-under-
inclusiveness of that presumption was not a fatal flaw. 
4. It is worth noting that this argument does not seem to 
work in the case of wives seeking secondary benefits when their 
Q~ 
husbands Aalive, but retired. That is the situation in several 
of the other cases with which this case was grouped. See note 
1, supra. 
5. See also, Kahn v. Shevin, supra, at 355. 
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To: Justice Powell 
From: TAB -Re: Follow-up on Mat .hews v. Goldfarb 
1. The civil service employees' loophole. The windfall gain that 
the Gov't attorney referred to results from the fact that Goldfarb, as 
a former civil service employee, was not covered by social security 
at all. In order to recover benefits, widowers must show both that 
they were dependent on their deceased spouse and that their primary 
insurance amounts (their social security entitlements which are related 
to the level of their incomes) are less than those of the deceased 
spouses. In the case of a widower who was covered by social security 
in his employment, the elimination of the dependency requirement would 
benefit him only if his income had been less than that of his spouse, 
because of the operation of the primary insurance amount requirement. 
This result would allow more widowers to recover than if the dependency 
requirement were enforced, but it would still bar recovery to those 
widowers who made more than their spouses. In the case of a widower 
who was a civil service employee, the primary insurance amount require-
ment is no requirement at all; such a widower has ~primary insurance 
amount because he was never in the social security system at all. 
(~~~") 
Such a widower would, in the absence of ~ dependency requirement, be ____ ........... _ "' -- ._ 
able to receive benefits although he earned more than his wife and 
. . 1 d f ' . . 1 . . ,, LS entLt e to a at CLVL servLce pensLon. Such a ~result is_ completely ..... 
inconsistent with the need-dependency rationale of the system, but 
L_ ~ ~...; 
equally anomalous results would occur if the genders were reversed. 
2. Effect of Mathews v. Lucas, 44 U.S.L.W. 5139 (1976). This 
is an important case that should be significant in the resolution of 
the instant case. Lucas involved social security survivorship benefits 
for children of deceased persons who were insured under the system. 
The case thus involved the same basic question as the instant case, 
differing only in that a different class of beneficiaries was involved. 
~
The--Ke'y to recovery for children was a showing of dep ,endency. The 
" statute contains a number of presumptions of dependency keyed to 
particular facts that are closely associated with dependency in fact. 
The children in Lucas were illegitimates who did not fall under any 
of the presumptions, some of which did include illegitimates. They -
therefore had to prove actual dependency. ThL C.o~r+ uphe.,/( f-J-..e... /o..w. 
The case is significant first in that the Court decided the case 
on the basis that dependency was the statutory requirement. The 
children had argued that the statute was designed to favor legitimates. 
The case adds to my conviction that Congress excluded widows from ( 
Cof~t€3S · 
the dependency requirement because ~ elt that it was a reasonably 
accurate assumption that they were dependent. I still am unconvinced 
by the Gov't's argument that Congress was trying to extend a helping 
hand to widows. 
The Court held that discrimination on the basis of illegitimacy 
does not "command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian 
political process." 44 U.S.L.W., at 5143. In the process of so 
holding, the Court noted that illegitimacy does not carry an obvious 
badge, as race and sex do, and stated that "discrimination against -
illegitimates has never approached the severity or pervasiveness 
of the historic legal and political discrimination against women and 
Negroes." Id. 
Against that background the Court held that administrative 
convenience could supply the justification for the statute. The 
following quotation is the Court's discussion of administrative 
convenience as a justification: 
Congress' purpose in adopting the statutory presump-
tions of dependency was obviously to serve adminis-
trative convenience. While Congress was unwilling to 
~ume that every child of a deceased insured was de-
pendent at the time of death, by presuming dependency 
on the basis of relatively readily documented !acts, such as 
legitimate birth, or existence of a support order or pa-
ternity decree, which could be relied upon to indicate the 
likelihood of continued actual dependency, Congress was 
able to avoid the burden and expense of s ecific case-S -
case e rmmatJOn m t e arge num er of cases where 
dependency is objectively probable. 1luch presumptiOns 
i~aid of administrative functions, though they may ap-
proximate, rather than precisely mirror, the results that 
case-by-case adjudication would show, are permissible 
under the Fifth Amendment, so long as that lack of pre-
cise equivalence docs not exceed the bounds of substan-
tiality tolerated by the applicable level of scrutiny. See 
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S., at 772.'6 
In cases of strictest scrutiny, such approximations 
must be supported at least by a showing that the Govern-
ment's dollar "lost" to overincluded benefit recipients is 
returned by a dollar "saved" in administrative expense 
avoided. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U .. S., at 689 
(plurality opinion). Under the standard of review ap-
propriate here, however, the materiality of the relation 
between the statutory classifications and the likelihood 
of dependency they assertedly reflect need not be "sci-
entifically substantiated." James v. Strange, 407 U. S. 
128, 133 (1972), quoting Roth v. United States, 354 
U. S. 476, 501 (1957) (separate opinion of Harlan, J.). 
Nor, in any case, do we believe that Congress is required 
in this realm of less than strictest scrutiny to weigh the 
burdens of administrative inquiry solely in terms of dol-
lars ultimately "spent," ignoring the relative amounts 
devoted to administrative rather than welfare uses. Cf. 
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S., at 784. Finally, while the 
'jl scrutiny by which their showing is to be judged is not a 
fl toothless one, e. g., Jimenez, supra; Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U. S., at 691 (concurring opinions of MR. Jus-
TICE STEWART and MR. JusTICE PowELL); Reed v. Reed, 
404 U. S. 71 (1971), the burden remains upon the ap-
pellees to demonstrate the insubstantialit oi that rela-
tion. See mdsley v. Natural arbonic Gas o., 220· 
U. S. 61, 78-79 (1911); cf. United States v. Gainey, 380 
U.S. 63, 67 (1965). 
44 U.S.L.W., at 5143. 
The Court also discussed Frontiero and, since this discussion 
in in the context of a social security case involving discrimination 
justified on the basis of administrative convenience, it is obviously 
important for the instant case. ,..--... The Court contrasted the sta tute 
before it in Lucas to that in Frontiero as follows: 
It is, of course, not enough simply that any child 
deceased insured is eligible for benefits upon some • 
ing of dependency. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 811 
we found it impermissible to qualify the entitlement 
dependent's benefits of a married woman in the u 
formed services upon an individualized showing of 
husband's actual dependence upon her for more t 
half his income, when no such showing of actual dell<'ncS. 
ency was required of a married man in the uniformed 
services to obtain dependent's benefits on account of hit 
J 
wife. The invalidity of that gender-based discrimina,. 
tion rested upon the "overbroad'' assumptiOn, Schlcsinga 
v-:--Bazlard, 419 U.S. 49"8, 508 (1975), underlying the dis-
crimination "that male workers' earnings are vttal to 
the support of thei.I' famtlies, while the earnings of reo 
male wage earners do not si mfican£ly contribute to 
their famt tes supPQ . Weinberger v. Wiescnfcld, 420 
U. g::" at 643; see Frontiero, 411 U. S., at GS9 n. 
23. Here, by contrast, the statute does not broadly dis-
criminate between legitimates and illegitimates without 
more but is carefully tuned to alternative considera.-' \ 
tions. The 'presumption of dependency is withht'ld o 
in the absence of any significant mdtcabon of t'fic likrU. 
hoOd of actual dependency. Moreover, we cannot . 1 
that the factors that give rise to a presuniption of dfoo. 
pendency lack any substantial relation to the likelihc 
of actual dependency, · - -
44 U.S.L.W., at 5144. 
Given the above language in Lucas, I think that it would be impossible 
in the instant case~tolsimply)assume an administrative convenience 
rationale. I think that Lucas might allow the Gov't to use a gender 
based discrimination if it could show administrative savings. Lucas 
I 
may be the explanation for the mid-stream shift in theories by the 
Gov't. Given that the Gov't did not build a trial record of adminis-
trative savings and given that it did not rely on that theory before ....___.__ 
this Court, I am inclined to say that ft loses . 
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JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
:§ttprtntt <!Jou.rt of tlrt 'Pnittb :§tatts 
~aslrington. l!l. <!f. 20bl'J~~ 
October 18, 1976 
Re: No. 75-699, Matthews v. Goldfarb 
Dear Chief, 
As presently advised, I vote to affirm the judgment 
under the authority of our prior decisions. I am not par-
ticularly happy with this result, however, and shall read 
with hospitable interest what is written on the other side~ 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
.inprtntt <!Jllltrl l.1f t4t ,-.mub' .§taftg 
.. Mfrhtghttt. ~. OJ. 20~~~ 
CHAMBERS Of" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE October 20, 1976 
;;. . 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: 75-699 - Matthews v. Goldfarb 
I have Potter's memo of October 18 still as a "tentative" vote to 
affirm, changing from "reverse" - at least on my record. Lewis is 
also "tentative affirm." 
If both Potter and Lewis remain in the "affirm" column (I having now 
voted to reverse), I, therefore, ask Bill Brennan to assign. 
WEB 
CHAMBERS OF" 
~u:pumc <!feud of tltt 'Jllnittb ~tlrlts 
'llas4ittghm. ~. <!f. 20c?'l-;l 
.JUSTICE WM . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
October 21, 1976 
RE: No. 75-699 Mathews v. Goldfarb 
Dear Chief: 
I have assigned the above case to myself. 
The Chief Justice 




.§u:pumt <!Jtturl ttf flrt ~u~ ;§tattll' 
~aglfhtghm. ~. <!J. 21lgt'-!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
October 21, 1976 
Re: 75-699 - Mathews v. Goldfarb 
Dear Bill: 
As you know, I have already expressed doubt 
about my original vote to affirm. Subject to 
reading your opinion, I am now persuaded that I 
will vote to reverse. My reason, in brief, is 
that the discrimination is in the distribution 
of benefits, rather than in the collection of 
tne tax; :t-hat, the discrimination is therefore 
against ales rather than females; and that, 
a oug r · . facie invalid, its justification 
is sufficient under Kahn v. Shevin. I don't 
believe this will cause you to lose ~our majority, 
but want you to understand my present thinking 
while your opinion is in process. 
Respe~fully, 
/{ 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
i)upulltt <!j:mtrlltf tJrt ~b' i)taftlt 
.. agfrin:ghm. ~. <!J:. 2.0~,.~ 
Re: 75-699 - Mathews v. Goldfarb 
Dear Bill: 
As you will note from the attached opinion, I 
have finally decided to vote to affirm. As I am 
sure you realize, I have had a great deal of dif-
ficulty with this case and I apologize to everyone 
for taking so long in making up my mind. 
Respectfully, 
}vL 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
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November 24, 1976 Conference 
List 5, Sheet 2 
No. 75-699 Motion of Appellee for Leave to 
File Supplemental Brief, after 
MATHEWS argument 
&~LDFARB 
This is appellee's motion for leave to file a supplemental brief (7 pages) after 
argument in which appellee discusses the opinion of CA 6 in Kalina_ v. Railroad 
Retirement Board, decided September 13, 1976. Appellee notes that Kalina, decided 
after appellee 1 s brief on the merits was filed and reported in Law Week after oral 
argument in this case, presents the identical constitutional issue raised in the instant 
case. 
There is no response. 
11/19/76 Goltz Slip op. in brief 
PJN 
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On Appe~tl from the United 
States District Court for 
the Eastern District of 
New York. 
[November -, 1976] 
MR. JusTIC& BRENN.\N" delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Under the federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability In-
llura.nce Beneffts program (OASDI) 42 U. S. C. §§ 401-431, 
survivors' benefits based on the earnings of a deceased hus-
band covered by the Act are payable to his widow. Such 
benefits on the basis of the earnings of a deceased wife 
covered by the Act are payable to the widower, however, 
only if he "was receiving at least one-half of his support" 
from his deceaaed wife.1 The question in this case is whether 
1 42 U.S. C.§ iP'J (f) (1), in pertinent part, provides: 
.. The widower • • • of an individual who died a fully insured individual, 
if such widower-
''(A) has not remarried, 
"(B) (i) ~llil attained age 60, or (ii) has attained age 50 ... and is 
under a disability • . . , · 
"(C) halil filed applicatiQn for widower's insurance benefits ... , 
"(D) (i) was receiving at least one-half of his t;upport . . . from such 
individual at the time of bf'r death , or if such individual had a period 
of disability whil!h did not end prior to the month in which she died, at 
the time such p¢riod began or at the time of her dPath , and filed proof 
of such support within two years after the date of such death ... , or 
(ii) was receiving at least. one-half of his· sltpport . . . from such indi-
'idual at the time ihe became entitled to old-age . .. insurance bene-
75--699-0PINION 
2 MATHEWSv.GOLDFA~B 
this gender.based distinction violates the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment. 
A three-ju~ge District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York held that the different treatment of men and 
women mandated by § ~ (f)(1)(D) constituted invidious 
discrimination against female wage earners by affording them 
less protection for their surviving spouses than is provided to 
male employees, 396 F. Supp. 308 (1975).1! We noted prob. 
able jurisdiction. 424 U. S. 906 (1976). We affirm. 
fits . . . , and filed proof of such support within two years after the 
month in which she became entitled to such benefits ... and, 
"(E) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits or is entitled to 
old-age insurance benefits each of which is less than the primary insurance 
amount of his deceased wife, 
"shall be entitled to a widower's insurance benefit . • . ." 
Compare 42 U. S. C. § 402 (e) (1), which provides, in pertinent part: 
"The widow . • . of an individual who dies a fully insured individual, 
if such widow . . • 
"(A) is not married, 
"(B )(i) has attained age 60, or (ii) has att~ined age 50 ... and is 
under a disability . . • , 
"(C) (i) has filed application for widow's insurance benefits ..• and 
"(D) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits or is entitled to 
old-age insurance benefits each of which is less than the primary insurance 
amount of such deceased individual, 
''shall be entitled to a widow's insurance benefit ••.. " 
2 'fhe decision also applied to § 402 (c) ( 1) (C), which imposes a depend~ 
ency requirement on husbands of covered female wage earners applying 
for old-age benefits; wives applying for such benefits are not required to 
prove dependency,§ 402 (b). These gender-based classifications have been 
uniformly held to be unconstitutional. See Abbott v. Weinberger, -
F. Supp. -, Civil No. C 74-194 (ND Ohio Feb. 12, 1976), appeal 
docketed sub nom. Mathews v. Abbott, No. 75-1643 (husband's old•age 
benefits); Coffin v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 400 
F. Supp. 953 (DC 1975) (three-judge court), appeal docketed sub nom. 
Mathews v. Coffin, No. 75--791 (both husband's and widower's benefits); 
Jablon v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 399 F. Supp.ll8 (Md. 
1975) (three-judge court), appeal docketed sub nom. Mathews v. Jablon, 
No. 75-739 (husband's benefits); Silbowitz v. Secretary of Health, Edu,.. 
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I 
Mrs. Hannah Goldfarb worked as a secretary in the New 
York City public school system for almost 25 years until 
her death in 1968. During that entire time she paid in full 
all social security taxes required by the Federal Insurance 
Contributions Act, 26 U. S. C. §§ 3101-3126. She was sur-
vived by her husband, Leon Goldfatb, now a.ge 72, a retired 
federal employee. Leon duly applied for widower's bene-
fits. The application was denied with the explanation that 
"You do not qualify for a widower's benefit because 
you do not meet ohe of the requirements for such en-
titlement. This requirement is that you must have 
been receiving at least one-half support from your wife 
when she died." 8 
The District Court declared § 402 (f)(1)(D) unconstitu-
cation and Welfare, 397 F. Supp. 862 (SD Fla. 1975) (three-judge court) , 
appeal docketed sub nom. Mathews v. Silbowitz, No. 75-712 (husband's 
benefits). See also Kalina v. Railroad Retirement Board, - F. 2d -, 
No. 75-2256 (CA6 Sept. 13, 1976) (spouse's annuity under the Railroad 
Retirement Act, 45 U.S. C. §231a(c)(3)(ii)). 
8 Although Mr. Goldfarb did not pursue an administrative appeal of 
the denial of his application, appellant concedes that because the denial 
was based on his failure to meet a clear statutory requirement, further 
administrative review would have been futile and the initial denia.I was 
therefore "final" for purposes of the District Court's jurisdiction to 
review it under 42 U. S. C. § 405 (g) . See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 
749, 764-767 (1975). 
In order for Mr. Goldfarb to have satisfied §402 (f)(1)(D), his wife 
would have to have been earning three times what he earned. According 
to Appellant's Brief, p. 25, "As a practical matter, only husbands whose 
wives contribute 75 percent of the family income meet [the dependency] 
test." That is because in order to meet the test, . the wife must have 
provided for all of her own half of the family budget, plus half of her 
husband's share.. For more elaborate descriptions of the dependency cal-
culation, see 20 CFR § 404.350; Social Security Claims Manual, §§ 2625, 
2628. See also Appellant's Brief, at 25-26, and n. 14; Appellee's Brief, at 
6 n. 7. 
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tional primarily on the authority of Weinbe11ger v. Wiesen-. 
feld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), stating 
" [ § 402 (f)( 1 )(D)] and its application to this plaintiff, 
'deprive women of protection for their families which 
men receive as a result of their employment.' Wein. 
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 636, 645 (1975). See 
also Frontie'lfo v. Ric_ha.rdson, 411 V. S. 677 (l973). 
"Whateyer may have been the ratio of contribution to 
family expenses of the Goldfarbs while they both 
worked, Mrs. Goldfarb was entitled to the dignity of 
knowing that her: social security ta~ would· contribute. 
to their joint welfare when the couple or one of them 
retired and her husband 's welfare should she predeceMe 
him. She paid taxes at the s~tme rate as men and there 
is not the slightest scintilla of support for the proposi-
tion tha.t workin~ women are less concerned about their 
spouses' welfare in old age than are men." 397 F. 
Supp. supra, at 308-309. 
II 
The gender-based distinction drawn by § 402 (f) (1) (D)-
burdening a widower but not a widow with the task of 
'·proving dependency upon the dece~tsed spouse-presents ~tn 
equal protection question indistinguishable from that decided \ 
in Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, supra. Tha.t decision and the 
decision in Frontiero v. Riclw,rdson, supra, plainly require 
affirmance of the judgment of the District Court. 
' '· The statutes held unconstitutional in Frontiero provided 
increased quarters allowance a.nd medical at~d dental bene-
fits to a married male member of the uniformed armed 
services whether or not his wife in fact depended on him, 
while a married female service member could only 
receive the increased benefits if she in fact provided over 
one-half of her husband's support. To justify the cla.ssific~t­
tion, the Government argued that "as an empirical m~ttter, 
75-699-0PINION 
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wives in our society frequently are dependent on their hus .. 
bands, while husbands are rarely dependent on their wives. 
Thus, ... Congress might reasonably have concluded that 
it would be both cheaper and easier simply conclusively to 
presume that wives of male members are financially de-
pendent on their husbands, while burdening female mem-
bers with the task of establishing dependency in fact.n 411 
U. S., at 688-689. But Frontiero concluded that, by accord-
ing such differential treatment to male and female mem-
bers of the uniformed services for the sole purpose of 
achieving administrative convenience, the challenged statute 
violated the Fifth Amendment. See Reed v. Reed, 4:04 U. S. 
71, 76 (1971); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 64:5, 650--657 
(1972); cf. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U. S. 498, 506-507 
(1975). 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, like the instant case, presented 
the question in the context of the OASDI progr&m. There 1 
the Court held" unconstitutional a provision that denied 
father's insurance benefits to surviving widowers with chil-
dren in their care, while authorizing similar mother's bene-
fits to similarly situated widows. Paula Wiesenfeld, the 
principal source of her family's support, t:~-nd covered by the 
Act, died in childbirth, survived by the baby and her hus-
band Stephen. Stephen applied for survivors' benefits for 
himself and his infant son. Benefits were allowed the baby 
under 42 U. S. C. § 402 (d), but denied the father on the 
ground that "mother's benefits" under § 402 (g) were avail-
able only to women. The Court reversed, holding that the 
gender-based distinction made by § 402 (g) was "indistin-
. guishable from that invalidated in Frontiero," 420 U. S., at 
642, and therefore) while_.---------
" .. . the notion that men are more likely than women 
to be the primary supporters of their spouses and chil-
dren is not entirely without empirical support, ... such 
a gender-based generalization ct:~-nnot suffice to justify 
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the denigration of the efforts of women who do worlc 
and whose earnings contribute significantly to their 
families' support. 
"Section 402 (g) clearly operates, as did the statutes 
invalidated by our judgment in Frontiero, to deprive 
women of protection for their families which men re .. 
ceive as a result of their employment. Indeed, the 
classification here is in some ways more pernicious . • • 
[I]n this case soci~ security taxes were deducted from 
Paula's salary during the years in which she worked. 
Thus, she not only failed to receive for her family 
the same protection which a similarly situated male 
worker would have received, but she also was deprived 
of a portion of her own earnings in order to contribute 
to the fund out of which benefits would be paid to 
others." ld., at 645. 
Precisely the same reasoning condemns the gender-based 
distinction made by § 402 (f) ( 1 )(D) in this case. For th~t 
distinction too operates Hto deprive women of protection for I 
their families which men receive fi,S a result of their em-
ployment": social security taxes were deducted from Hannah 
Goldfarb's salary during the quarter-century she worked as 
a secretary, yet, in consequence of§ 402 (f)(l)(D), she also 
"not only failed to receive for her [spouse] the same pro-
tection which a similarly situated male worker would have 
received [for his spouse] but she also was deprived of a 
portion of her earnings in order to contribute to the fund 
out of which benefits would be paid to others." Wiesenfeld 
thus inescapably compels the conclusion reached by the Dis-
trict Court that the gender-based differentiation created by 
§ 402 (f)( I) (D)-that results in the efforts of female work-
ers required to pay social security taxes producing less pro-
tection for their spouses than is produced by the efforts of 
men-is forbidden by the Constitution, at least when sup-
ported by , no more substantial justification than "archaic 
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~~ond overbroad" generalizations, Schlesinger v. Ballard, supra, 
419 U. S., at 508, or "old notions," Stanton v. Stanton, 421 
U. S. 7, 14 (1975), such as "assumptions as to dependency," 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra, at 645, that are more con-
sistent with "the role-typing society has long imposed," 
Stanton v. Stanton, supra, at 15, than with contemporary 
reality. Thus § 402 (f) (1) (D) "[b]y providing dissimilar 
treatment for men and women who are . . . similarly situ-
ated ... violates the [Fifth Amendment]. Reed v. Reed, 
404 u. s. 71, 77. " Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra, 
at 653. 
III 
Appellant, however, would focus equal protection analysis 
not upon the discrimination against the covered wage earning 
female, but rather upon whether her surviving widower was 
unconstitutionally discriminated against by burdening him 
but not a surviving widow with proof of dependency. The 
gist of the argument is that, analyzed from the perspective of 
the widower, " ... the dehial of behentS reflected the congres-
sional judgment that aged widowers as a class were suffi-
ciently likely not to be dependent upon their wives, that it 
was appropriate to deny them benefits unleSs they were in 
fact dependent." Appellant's Brief, p. 12. 
But Weinberger v. Wiesen/eld rejected the virtually iden-
tical argument when appellant's predecessor argued that the 
statutory classification there attacked should be regarded 
from the perspective of the prospective beneficiary and not 
from that of the covered wa.ge earner. The Secretary's 
Brief in that case, p. 14, argued that " ... the pattern of 
legislation reflects the considered judgment of Congress that 
the 'probable need' for financial assistance is greater in the 
case of a widow, with young children to maintain, than in 
the case of similarly situated males." The Court, however, 
analyzed the classification from the perspective of the wage 
earner and concluded tha.t the clMiification was uncQhiti-
r5-699:-,;8PINION 
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tutional because "benefits must be distributed according to 
classifications which do not without sufficient justification 
differentiate among covered employees solely on the basis 
of sex." 420 U. S., at 647. Thus, contrary to appellant's 
insistence, Appella.nt's Brief, p. 12, Wiegenfeld is "dispositive 
here." 
From its inception, the social security system has be~n 
~program of social insurance. Covered employees and their 
employers pay taxes into a fuhd administered distinct froln 
the general federal revenues to purchase protectioi1 against 
the economic consequences of old age, disability and death. 
But under § 402 (f)(l)(D) female insureds received less pro• 
tection for their spouses solely because of their sex.. Mrs. 
Goldfarb worked and paid social security taxes for 25 years 
at the same rate as her male collea.gues, but because of § 402 
(f)(l)(D) the insurance protection received by the males was 
broa.Qer than hers. Pl~inly then § 402 (f) (l)(D) di~van­
tages women contributors to the social security system as com-
pared to similarly situated men.4 The section then "impel': 
missibly discriminates against a female wage earner because it 
provides her family less protection thah it provides that of a 
male wa.ge earner, even though the fa.tllily needs may be iden-
tical." 4~0 U. S., at 654-655 (PowELL, J., concurring). 
In a sense of course both the female wage earner and her 
sur.viving spouse are disadvantaged by operation of the 
statute, but this is because "Social Security is designed .. , 
4 • The qisadvanta~e to the woman wage earner is even more pronoun ceq 
in the case of t!ld-age benefits, to which a similarly \lnequal dependency 
requirement applies. 42 U. S. C. §§ 402 (b), (c) (1) (C). See n. 2, supra. 
~n that situation, where the insured herself Is still living, she is deniecl 
not only "the dignity of knowing [during her working career] that her 
social security tax would contribute to their joint welfare when the couple 
or one of them retired and her husband's welfare should she predecease 
hirq," Goldfarb v. Secretary of Realth, F.{ducation and Welfare, 396 F, 
Supp, 308, 309 (EDNY 1975), but abo the more tangible benefit. of an 
incteasr, ~n th~ income of tllc famio/ ~nit l()f which she remains a .parh 
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for the protection of the family," 420 U. S., a,t 654. (JusTICE 
PowELL concurring), • and the section discriminates against 
one particular category of f~ily-that in which the female 
spouse is a wage earner covered by social security.(1 There-
fore decision of the equal protection challenge in this case 
cannot focus solely on the distinction drawn between widow-
ers and widows but, as Wiesenfeld held, upon the gender-based 
discrimination against covered female wage earners as well. 7 
IV 
Appellant's emphasis upon the sex based distinction be-
tween widow and widower as recipients of benefits rather 
5 See, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., at 7 (1939), 
accompanying the bill that extended social security benefits for the first 
time beyond the covered wage earner himself. The Report emphasizes 
that the purpose of the amendments was "to afford more adequate pro-
tection to the family as a unit." (Emphasis supplied.) 
6 This is accepted by appellant. and appellees. See, e. g., Appellant's 
Brief, at 13 n. 2; Appellee's Brief, at 23; Tr. of Oral Arg., at 7. 
1 In any event, gender-based discriminations against men have been 
invalidated when they do ~ot "serve important governmental objectives 
and [are not] substnntially rE'lated to the achievement of those objectives." 
C~ IJ9ren,- U.S.-,-· (1976). Neither Kahn v. Shevin, 416 
U. 8. 351 (1974), nor Schlesinge1· v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975), relied 
on by appellnnt, supports a contrary conclusion. The gender-based dis-
tinctions in the stntutes involved in Kahn and Ballard were justified because 
the only discernible purpose of each wns the permissible one of redressing 
our society's longstanding disparate treatment of women. Craig v. Boren, 
supra, at- n. 6 (1976). 
But "the mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an 
automatic shield that protects ngainst nny inquiry into the actual purposes 
underlying a legislative scheme."" Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S. 
636, 648 (1975). That inquiry in this case demonstrates thnt § 402 (f) 
(1) (D) has no such remedial purpose. Se<> Part IV-B, infra. More-
over, the classifications rhallenged in Wiesenfeld and in this case rather 
than advantage women to compensate for past wrongs compounds those 
wrongs by penalizil1g women "who do work and whose earnings contribute 





than that between covered female and covered male em~ 
ployees also emerges in his other arguments. These argu~ 
ments have no merit. 
A 
We accept as settled the proposition argued by appellant 
that Congress has wide latitude to create classifications that 
allocate noncontractual benefits under a social welfare pro~ 
gram. Weinberger v. Salfi , 422 U. S. 749, 77&-777 (1975); 
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 609- 610 (1960). It is 
generally the case, as said in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S., 
at 611, that 
"Particularly when we deal with a withholding of a 
noncontractual benefit under a social welfare program 
such as [Social Security], we must recognize that the 
Due Process Clause can be thought to interpose a bar 
only if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classi~ 
fication, utterly lacking in rational justification." 
See also Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, 422 U. S., at 768-770; 
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 , 84 (1971); Dandridge 
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485-486 (1970). 
But this "does not, of course, immunize [social welfare 
legislation] from scrutiny under the Fifth Amendment." 
Richardson v. Belcher, supra, 404 U. S. , at 81. The Social 1 
Security Act is permeated with provisions that draw lines 
in classifying those who are to receive benefits. Congres-
sional decistons in this regard are entitled to deference as 
those of the institution charged under our scheme of gov-
ernment with the primary responsibility for making such 
judgments in light of competing policies and interests, But 
"[t]o withstand constitutional ch~llenge, . .. classifications 
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and 
must be substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives." Craig v. Boren,- U. S.-,- (1976).8 Such 
s Thus, justHic~tions that suffice for non-gender-based classific~ttions in 
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classifications, however, ha.ve frequently been revealed on 
analysis to rest only upon "old notions" and "archaic and 
overboard" generalizations, Stanton v. Stanton, supra, 421 
U. S., at 14; Schlesinger v. Ballard, supra, 419 U. S., at 508; 
cf. Mathews v. Lucas, 44 U. S. L. W. 5139, 5144 (1976), 
and so have been found to offend the prohibitions &gainst 
denial of equal protection of the law., Reed v. Reed, supra; 
Frontiero v. Richardson, supra; Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 
supra; Stanton v. Stanton, supra; Craig v. Boren, supra. See 
also Stanley v. Illinois, supra; Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U. S. 
522 (1975). 
Therefore, Wiesenfeld, 420 U. S., at 640-647, expressly re-
jected the argument of appellant's predecessor, relying on 
Flemming v. Nestor, that the "non-contractual" interest of 
a covered employee in future social security benefits pre-
cluded any claim of denial of equal protection. Rather, 
Wiesenfeld held that the fact that the interest is "non-
contractual" does not mean that "a covered employee has 
no right whatever to be treated equally with other employees 
as regards the benefits which flow from his or her employ-
ment," nor does it "sanction differential protection for 
covered employees which is solely gender-based." 420 U. S., 
the social welfare area. do not necessarily justify gender discriminations. 
For example, Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U. S. 749 (1975), sustained a dis-
crimination d~igned to weed out collusive marriages without making 
case-by-case determinntions bE>hveen marriages of less than nine months' 
duration and longer ones on thE> ground that 
"While such a limitation donbtles;; proves in particular cases to be 'under-
inclusive' or 'over-inclusive' in light of its presumed purpose, it is none-
theless a widely accepted response to legitimate interests in admini~trative 
economy and certainty of coverage for those who meet its terms." /d., 
at 776. 
Yet administrntive conveniencE> and certainty of result have been found l 
inadequate justifications for grndE>r-basf'cl ela;;~ifications. Reed v. Reed, 
404 U. S. 71, 76 (1971); Fmntiero v. Ri(·hardson, 411 U. 8. 677, 690 
(1973); Stanley v. Illinois, ,.05 U.S. 645, 656-657 (1972). Cf. Mathew8 
v. Lucas, 44 U.S. L. W. 5139, 5143 (1976). 
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~t 646. On the contrary, benefits "directly related to years 
worked and amount earned by a covered employee, and not 
to the needs of the beneficiaries directly," like the 
employment-related benefits in Frontiero, "must be distrib-
uted according to classifications which do not without sufli. 
cient justification differentiate among covered employee1 
solely on the basis of sex." 420 U. S., at 647. 
B 
Appellant next argues that Frontiero and Wiesenfeld l 
lhould be distinguished as involving statutes with different 
objectives than § 402 (f) (1) (D). Rather than merely 
enacting presumptions designed to save the expense and 
trouble of determining which spouses are really dependent, 
providing benefits to all widows, but only to such widowers 
as prove dependency, § 402 (f) ( 1) (D), it is argued, ration. 
ally defines different standards of eligibility because of the 
differing social welfare needs of widowers and widows. That 
is, the argument runs, Congress may reasonably have pre .. 
sumed that nondependent widows, who receive benefits. are 
needier than nondependent widowers, who do not, because 
of job discrimination against women (particularly older 
women), 'see Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U. S. 3!H, 353-354 (1974), 
and because they are more likely to have been more depen-
dent on their spouses. See Wiesenfeld, supra, 420 U. S., at 
645; Kahn v. Shevin, supra, 416 U. S., at 354 n. 7.u 
But "inquiry into the actual purposes" of the discrimina~ ( 
tion, Wiesenfeld, supra, 420 U. S., at 648, proves the contrary. 
First, § 405 (f)(l) (D itself is phrased in terms of depend .. 
0 This a.rgument is made for the first time in Appellant's Brief. The 
Jurisdictional Statement argued only thr rationality of "extending tG 
wom~ . , • the presumption of dependenry.'' J. St., nt 11 . 
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wives for more than one-half of their support. On the face 
of the statute, dependency, not need, is the criterion for 
inclusion. 
Moreover, the general scheme of OASDI shows that de-
pendence on the covered wage earner is the critical factor 
in determining beneficiary categories. 10 OASDI is intended 
to insure covered wage earners and their families against the 
economic and social impact on the family normally entailed 
by loss of the wage earner's income due to retirement, dis-
ability, or death, by providing benefits to replace the lost 
wages. Cf. Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U. S. 628, 633-634 
(1974). Thus. benefits are not paid, as under other welfare 
programs, simply to categories of the population at large 
who need economic assistance, but only to members of the 
family of the insured wage earner." Moreover, every family 
member other than a wife or widow is eligible for benefits 
only if a dependent of the covE-red wage earner.12 This ac-
cords with the system's general purpose; one who was not 
dependent to some degree on the covered wage earner suffers 
10 Although presumed need ha:s b('('n a fuetor in determining tiH' nmouut:s 
of social security benefits, in addition 1o the extent of contribution!; made 
to the system, the primary determinant;; of the benefits received are the 
years worked and amount earned by tlw coverf'd worker. 42 U. S. C. 
§§ 414, 415. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 647, and nn. 14, 
15 (1975). In any event, need i!S not a requirement. for inC'Iusion in any 
beneficiary category, 42 U. S. C. § 402, and from the beginning was 
intended to be irrelevant to the right to receive benefit!S. Sec H . H. Rep. 
No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., at. 1 (19a5). 
11 Old-nge and survivor!S' bmefits may be paid to the in:sured wage 
ea.rner himself, 42 U. S. C. § 402 (2): hilS :spou:se, while he is :still alive, 
§402(b), (c), or after his death, §402 (e) , (f), (g); his children, §40'2 
(d); and his parent!S, § 402 (h). 
1: Dependenc~· is a piwrqui:,;ih• to qualification for parents' benefits, 
§402 (h)(l)(B), children'~' benefits. §402 (d)(l)(C), husbands' benefits, 
§402 (c)(l)(C), and widower;;' benefits, §40'2 (f)(l)(D) . (Certain chil-
dren are "deemed" dependent, § 402 (d) (3). This pre:sumption wail 
upheld as sufficif'ntly accurate to pass scrutiny on grounds of ''administra• 
tive convenience," Mathew8 v. Lucas, 44 0. S. L, W. 5139 (1976) .) 
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no economic loss when the wage earner leaves the work 
force. Thus the overall statutory scheme makes actual depend-
ency the generf\,1 basis qf eligibility for OASDI benefits, and 
the statute, in omitting that requirement for wives and 
widows, reflects only a presumption that they are ordinarily 
dependent. At all events, nothing whatever suggests a rea-
soned congressional judgment that nondependent widows 
should receive benefits because they are more likely to be 
needy than nondependent widowers. 
Finally, the legislative history of § 402 (f) (1) (D) refutes I 
appellant's contention. The old age provisions of the ori~naJ 
Social Security Act, 49 Stf\,t. 622 (1935), provided pension 
benefits only to the wage earner himself, with a lump-sum 
p~yment to his estate under certain circumstances.la Wives' 
and widows' benefits were first provided when coverage was 
extended to other family members in 1939. Social Security 
Act Amendments of 1939, 53 Stat. 1360, 1364-1366. The I 
general purpose of the amendments was "to ~ord more 
adequate protection for the family as a unit." H. R. Rep. 
No, 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., at 7 (1939). • (Emphasis sup-
plied.) The House Ways and Mea.ns Committee criticized 
the old lump·sum pay1nent because it "make[s] payments 
to the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether or 
not he leaves dependents." Ibid. The Socia.l Security 
Board, which had initiated the amendments in a report trans., 
mitted by the President tQ Congress, recommended the adop-
tion of survivors' benefits because "The payment of mouthly 
benefits to widows and orphans, who are the two chief 
classes of dependent survivors, would furnish more significant 
protection than does the payment of lump-sum benefits." 
H. R. Doc. No. 110, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1939).14 In 
1a This paym~nt ~s:sentially nmounted to :3Y2% of th~ wnge l.'arncr's 
earnings while covered. less t.he amount rec~iveq as an old-age pension, 
Social Security Act §203, 49 Stat. 623 (1935). 
14 See also remark:; of Semltor l-{Rrricon, 84 Cong. Rec. 8827 ( 1939), 
To tlt!! extent thflt this statement- indir&tes thnt Qpngres.~ founc{ wi<lP\\\~ 
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~tddition to recommending survivors' benefits, the Board sug. 
gested the extension of old-age pension benefits "for the 
aged dependent wife of the retired worker.l,/i /d., at 6. On 
the Senate floor, Senator Harrison, the principal proponent 
of the amendments. criticized the then existing system of 
benefits because under it "no regard is had as to whether 
[the covered wage earner] has a dependent wife, or whether 
he dies leaving a child, widow, or parents." 84 Cong. Rec. 
8827 (1939). There is no indication whatever in any of the 
legislative history that Congress gave any attention to the 
specific case of nondependent widows. and found that they 
were in need of benefits despite their lack of dependency, 
in order to compensate them for disadvantages caused by 
sex discrimination. There is every indication that, as 
Wicsenfeld, supra, recognized. 420 U. S., at 644. "the framers 
of the Act legislated on the 'then generally accepted pre· 
sumption that a man is responsible for the support of his 
wife and children,' D. Hoskins & L. Bi"by, Women and 
Social Security: Law and Policy in Five Countries, Social 
Security Administration Research Report No. 42, p. 77 
(1973)." lU 
Survivors' and old age benefits were not extended to hus-
bands and widowers until 1950. 64 St~t. 483-485. The 
legislative history of this provision also demonstr~tes that 
Congress did not create the disparity between nondependent 
widows and widowers with a compensatory purpose. The 
and orphans needier than other dependents, it may support a discrimina-
tion between dependent widows and dependPnt widowers, but it certainly 
dt>monstra IPs a congressional a~s11mpt\on that widows are dependent, 
rat.hf'r than an intention to ald nondPpcndent widows because of a finding 
that. thPy arP neediE-r than nondependent. widowers. 
1" &e also Final Heport of t.lw Advisory Council on Social Security, at 
24 ( 1938): "The inadequacy of th~ benefits payable during the early 
years of the old-age insurance program is more marked where the benefits 
must support not only the annuitant himself, but also his wife." 
Ju S<•e also the further excerpts from and discussion of the legislative 
l•i~tQry in U'iesenfelrl, 420 U. S., at 644 n. 13. 
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impetus for change came from the Advisory Council on 
Social Security, which recommended benefits for "the aged, 
dependent husband ... [and] widower." The purpose of 
this recommendation was "[t]o equalize the protection given 
to the dependents of women and men" because "[u]nder 
the present program, insured women lack some of the rights 
which insured men ca.n acquire." Advisory Council on So-
cial Security, Recommendations for Social Security Legisla-
tion, S. Doc. No. 208, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., at 38 (1949). 
(Emphasis supplied.) It is clear from the Report that the 
Advisory Council assumed that the provision of bene-
fits to dependent husbands and widowers was the equivalent 
of the provision of benefits to wives and widows under the 
previous statute, and not a lesser protection deliberately 
made because of lesser need. Although the original House 
Bill H. R. 6000 that became the Social Security 
Act Amendments of 1950 did not contain a provision for 
husbands' and widowers' benefits, the Senate Finance 
Committee added it, because "the committee believes that 
protection given to dependents of women and men should 
be made more comparable." S. Rep. No. 1669, 81st Cong., 
2d Sess. , at 28 (1950). In 1950, as in 1939, there was simply 
no indication of an intention to create a differential treatment 
for the benefit of nondependent wives. 
We conclude, therefore, that the differential treatment of 
nondependent widows and widowers results not, as appellant 
asserts, from a deliberate congressional intention to remedy 
the arguably greater needs of the former. but rather from 
an intention to aid the dependent spouses of deceased wage 
earners. coupled with a presumption that wives are usually 
dependent. This presents precisely the situation faced in 
Frontiero and Wiesenfeld. The only conceivable justifica-
tion for writing the presumption of wives' dependency into 
the statute is the assumption, not verified by the Govern-
ment in Frontiero , 411 U. S., at 689, or here, but based sim-
ply on "archaic and overbroad" generalizations, Schlesinger v. 
. ' 
H I• ..... 
t 1 I ,. ' ·r·' . ; ~ 
('·,. ,, 
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Ballard, supra, 419 U. S., at 508, that it would save the 
Government time, money, and effort simply to pay benefits 
to all widows, rather than to require proof of dependency 
of both sexes.17 We held in Frontiero, and again in Wiesen-
feld, and therefore hold again here, that such assumptions do 
not suffice to justify a gender-based discrimination in the 
distribution of employment-related benefits.18 
Affirmed. 
17 In fact, the legislative history suggP8ts that Congress proceeded cas-
ually on a "then generally accepted" l'ltrrrotype and did not focus on the 
possible expense of determining dependC"nce in every case. 
18 Even if appellant's theory of the purpose of the discrimination 
were accurate, it would not necessarih lollow that the classification 
is "fairly and substantially related" to that purpose. Reed v. Reed, 404 
U. S. 71 , 76 (1971) . If Congress inh•nded to provide greater bene-
fit s to widows because they were perc<•ived as generally needier than 
widowers, it cho~e a strikingly imprecise instn.1ment.. On the one hand, 
all widows of wage earners covered by social security are presumed 
needy, regardless of whether they are actually needy or of whether they 
were dependent on their deceased husbands. Though widows as a class 
may well constitute a disadvantaged group, the precise sub-class of 
widows benefited by the discrimination at is~>ht> here are those least likely 
to be needy: those whose husbands were covered wage earners and who 
themselves earned enough not to be dependent on their husbands' earn-
ings. Widows dependent on husbands who had no social security protec-
tion, likely to be the neediest of the needy class, are not reached at all 
by the benefits provided here, and dependent widows of covered wage 
earners receive no greater benefit than widowers in the same situation. 
The discriminatory scheme i:s not carefully tailored to meet the needs of 
even those nondependent widpws who benefit from it, because any subsidy 
given through the OASDI system is not related to need, but to the years 
worked and amount earned by the covered wage earner. 
On the other hand, widowers of covered individuals are presumed less 
needy unless their wives out~earned them by 3 to 1. Just as many work-
ing wives would fail this test if it were applied to them, so there are many 
widowers whose accustomed standard of living depended in considerable 
measure on their wives' earnings, even if they could not demonstrate 
dependency under this formula.. Tile actual poverty of the widower is 
not taken into account, only wllether he can pass the stringent dependency 
test. 
,§;ttprtHH' cq(lnrt (1f tlp•1tnit.dl ~tnks 
1UusiritHJftm, p . Qf. <!112>~;_3 
CHAI..,l3LRS Of" 
.JUSTI CE THURGOOD MAI~SHALL December 2, 18 7 6 
Re: No . 7 5- G9 9 - Mathews v. Goldfarb 
Dear B ill : 
Please j ojn me . 
Sincerely, 
(jp{ . 
T . M . 
Mr . Justice Brennan 
cc : The Conference 
./ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
~u:prtnu <!Jllllrl ttf tJrt ~tb ~fldtg 
.,.Mlfi:ttgfon. ~- <!J. 2llgiJ!.~ / 
December 2, 1976 
Re: No. 75-699 - Mathews v. Goldfarb 
Dear Bill: 
In due course, I will circulate a dissent in this 
case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 

,jttpT.tmt <!Jttud of tfrt ~t~ ,jtat:ta-
:.raa-Jringimt. ~. <!J. 2ll,?Jl.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
December 7, 1976 
Re: No. 75-699 - Mathews v. Goldfarb 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
/ 1 « 
~ ~t....---------
1 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
~rtutt Qfcurl ttf tqt 1littitt~ ,itaftg 
.. ag!p:ttgtmr. ~. <!f. 2ll.;t.l!.;l 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
December 13, 1976 
Re: No. 75-699 - Mathews v. Goldfarb 
Dear Bill: 
I am, of course, awaiting the dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~1qrrm.: Clfeltttof tlrt~b .§futtg 
'PJCU¥l("innf.ctl4 ~. ~ 20P:>!-~ 
December 14, 1976 
75-699- Mathews v. Goldfarb 
Dear Bill, 
As I have indicated to you orally, I 
think your proposed opinion for the Court is 
a remarkably fine job, and that, given 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, the result it 
reaches is close to unanswerable. As I have ' 
also orally indicated, however, I have had 
some second thoughts about the Wiesenfeld 
decision, and for that reason shall await the 
dissenting opinion. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAM BERS OF 
~u:prtmt <qoud of tqt ~tb ~tatte 
~aeJrittgton. ~. <q. 20~J!-~ j 
JUSTICE WM . J . BR E NNAN . JR. 
January 3, 1977 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 75-699 Mathews v. Goldfarb 
Upon reading Bill Rehnquist's dissent, I propose to 
make no changes beyond insertion of the following footnote 
at the end of the first paragraph of Part II on page 4: 
The dissent maintains that this sentence 11 0ver-
states [the] relevance 11 of Wiesenfeld and Frontiero. 
It is sufficient to answer that the principal propo-
sitions argued by appellant and in the dissent, --
namely, the focus on discrimination between surviving, 
rather than insured, spouses; the reliance on Kahn v. 
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), the argument that the 
presumption of female dependence is empirically sup-
portable, and the emphasis on the special deference 
due to classifications in the Social Security Act --
were all asserted and rejected in one or both of those 
cases as justifications for statutes substantially 
similar in effect to Sec. 402(f)(l)(D). 
W.J.B. Jr. 
.§nvumt (!ftutrl :of tlrt 'Jttnittb- .§brlts 
._IW'lringhm. ~. (!f. 2ll&iJ!.' 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
January 3, 1977 
'· Re: 75-699 - Mathews v. Goldfarb 
Dear Bill: 
Although I expect to join your dissent, I 
want to try my hand at a few additiona~ paragraphs 
to point up the difference between this case and 
cases like Mathews v. Lucas and Craig v. Boren. 
Respectfully, 
JL 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS Of' 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
• 
~mtt <!Jcnrlxtf tlrt 'Jfltrittb ~taftg 
'J!IMJrhtghm.ltl. <!J. 2!lbiJ!~ 
January 4, 1977 
No. 75-699, Mathews v. Goldfarb 
Dear Bill, 
Mter considerable backing and filling, 
I have concluded that yours is the preferable 
conclusion in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~u:punu <qou:rt of t4t 'JUnittb ~Wte 
'Jifas~i:ngton. ~· <q. 2Il,?J.1.,:3 
January 4, 1977 
Re: 75-699 Mathews v. Goldfarb 
Dear Bill: 
/ v 
I join your dissent. It should convince even 
the most ardent "equal protector"! 
Regards, 
WEB 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: The Conference 
Lewis, 
How can you not agree with WHR!? 
WEB 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE WM . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
~ttpl"tmt <q:ou.rt of tqt ~ttittb ~i 4 
~zudpnghm. ;!9. <q:. 20~>!-~ 
January 6, 1977 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 75-699 Mathews v. Goldfarb 
My circulation in this case explains why this case is con-
trolled by Frontiero and Wiesenfeld, and this memo is circulated 
simply to suggest why Bill Rehnquist's dissent does not, in my 
view, succeed in distinguishing those cases. 
Bill's first major thread is that the Social Security Act is 
somehow sui generis and therefore invulnerable to equal protection 
attacks. This is precisely the argument, however, that was used to 
attempt to distinguish Wiesenfeld from Frontiero, and we squarely 
rejected it. 420 U.S., at 646-647. Indeed, Wiesenfeld held that 
the fact that the case arose in the context of the contributory 
social security system made the discrimination there "more pernicious" 
than that in Frontiero. 420 U.S., at 645. Bill argues, however, 
that Mathews v. Lucas, 44 USLW 5139 (1976), and '~einberger v. Salfi, 
422 U.S. 749 (1975), embraced the argument rejected in Wiesenfeld 
and established a new principle that constitutional doctrines de-
veloped in other fields of law do not have the same force in the 
context of the Social Security Act, and that this new principle 
undercuts Wiesenfeld. 
But nothing in Salfi or Lucas purports to establish any new 
principle, or to cast any doubt on Wiesenfeld. Salfi was decided 
only three months after Wiesenfeld. It relies on such cases as 
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), Dandridge v. Williams, 
397 U.S. 471 (1970), and Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971). 
See 422 U.S., at 768-770. All of these cases pre-dated Wiesenfeld, 
and Wiesenfeld and my opinion in Goldfarb, like Salfi, recognize 
the principle they establish, namely that congressional judgments 
in the field of social welfare are to be accorded considerable 
deference. Salfi did not involve sex discrimination, or indeed 
any equal protection issue at all, dealing instead with the quite 
- 2-
different doctrine of conclusive presumptions. The concern it ex-
presses that overuse of that doctrine could invalidate the myriad 
examples of line-drawing in the Social Security Act, such as the 
requirement that claims be filed within 60 days rather than, say, 
75, given as the reason for limiting the doctrine in the social 
security context, 422 U.S., at 772-773, hardly seems applicable to 
the limited use of the equal protection clause to prevent gender 
discrimination. Cases this Term such as Mathews v. deCastro and 
Knebel v. Rein demonstrate that restraint against erasure of lines 
drawn on bases other than gender presents no problem. Thus, Salfi 
simply does not represent any new departure inconsistent with 
Wiesenfeld. 
Nor does Lucas teach that a distinction impermissible in another 
area · is permissible in the context of the Social Security Act. Lucas 
relies both on cases arising under the Social Security Act, e.g., 
Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974), and on cases in other 
areas,~., Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Weber v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), in support of the standard 
applied to the classification at issue in that case. 44 USLW at 5141-
5142. And of particular significance, Lucas most carefully distinguish-
ed Frontiero and Wiesenfeld, noting that "discrimination against ille-
gitimates has never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the 
historic legal and political discrimination against women and Negroes.•• 
Id., at 5142. In Frontiero and Wiesenfeld, 
The invalidity of [the] gender-based discrimination rested 
upon the "overbroad" assumption, Schlesinger v. Ballard, 
419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975), underlying the discrimination 
"that male workers' earnings are vital to the support of 
their families, while the earnings of female wage earners 
do not significantly contribute to their families' support." 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S., at 643; see Frontiero, 
411 U.S., at 689 n. 23. Here, by contrast, the statute does 
not broadly discriminate between legitimates and illegitimates 
without more, but is carefully tuned to alternative consider-
ations. 
44 USLW at 5144. This same overbroad presumption, which we condemned 
in Frontiero and Wiesenfeld, is at the heart of "the severe [and] per-
vasive ••• historic legal and political discrimination against women, 11 
and is the basis of the statute under review. Nothing in Salfi or 
Lucas remotely suggests that legislation based on this damaging pre-
sumption about women is any more permissible in the Social Security 
Act than in other legislation, or more permissible now than it was 
less than two years ago. 
- 3-
Bill's second thread is his reliance on Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 
351 (1974). This argument was also made in Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S., at 
648, and rejected there. It was rejected precisely because the Court 
decided that a classification cannot be regarded as remedial, and 
thus exempt from heightened scrutiny, when it penalizes working women 
by giving them less insurance protection for their families on the 
basis of an invidious and overbroad presumption that has historically 
been used to discriminate against them. Bill challenges Wiesenfeld's 
deliberately chosen focus of the equal protection analysis from the 
viewpoint of the wage-earning wife; he says that focus was "question-
able", dissent at 15. However questionable, it was the basis of both 
Court and concurring opinions in Wiesenfeld, which seven of us joined. 
Moreover, it cannot be questioned that a discrimination against the 
survivors of a deceased insured on the basis of the sex of the insured 
is at least in some part a discrimination against the insured. Social 
security benefits, after all, unlike the subsidy in Kahn, are available 
only to those who stand in a defined relationship to the insured; they 
are not awarded to recipients solely on the basis of their own char-
acteristics. The benefits are earned by the insured, and in a real 
sense accrue to him or her as much as to the nominal recipient. (The 
benefit accrues to the insured in a more tangible sense in the case of 
. the living retired insured covered by the spouses' insurance provisions 
at issue in the companion cases.) A discrimination that affects 'vork-
ing women in this way, as Wiesenfeld squarely held, cannot be regarded 
as remedial. 
In short, I can find nothing in Bill's dissent that provides any 
principled basis for distinguishing Wiesenfeld and Frontiero, or in-
deed raises any arguments that were not raised in Wiesenfeld and re-
jected. I simply cannot accept Bill's proposal that a decision joined 
by all but one Justice only two Terms ago should now be so thoroughly 
repudiated. This "ardent 'equal protector"', at least remains un-
persuaded. 
W.J.B. Jr. 
CHAMBE RS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
Dear Bill: 
.:§np-um.t <!fcurl of tqt ~ttitth ~hUt 
~ltltJri:ttgtctt.19. <!f. 2llc?~~ 
February 22, 
Re: No. 75-699 - Mathews v. Goldfarb 
Please join me in your dis sent. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
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